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3-2 A Common European Identity Is an Illusion 
In Hubert Zimmermann and Andreas Dür (eds.) Key Controversies in European Integration 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp.103-11. 
 
Jonathan White (London School of Economics and Political Science) 
 
There is a simple idea at the heart of discussions of ‘European identity’. It is that some kind of 
social underpinning is required for a political community to survive and prosper. The 
argument may be mainly empirical – that some kind of mass bond is required if a polity is to 
be unified, strong, and able to provide public goods, particularly in crisis moments – or it may 
be mainly normative – that only where such a bond exists will the polity meet the standards of 
legitimacy the modern world expects. Where ‘identity’ is present, coherence, common 
purpose and a disposition to solidarity are said to be forthcoming. Where it is absent, lack of 
direction and fatal divisions are expected to follow. Be it for empirical or normative reasons, 
‘identity’ is posed as a polity’s necessary foundation, and its absence as a reason for 
scepticism. As readers will know, it is in the context of exactly such hopes and doubts 
regarding the prospects of the EU that the question of European identity has been consistently 
raised.
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This gives us an indication of the intended function of a collective identity, but what of 
its particular form? What does the term denote? A misleading question perhaps, for ‘identity’ 
is often used with little descriptive intent, instead as a casual means to reference all those 
‘soft’ dimensions of human existence left over once the ‘hard’ issues of economy and 
institutions have been considered. When interested actors such as the European Commission 
speak of ‘European identity’, generally they are not so much referring to a clear-cut entity as 
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 We shall treat ‘European identity’ as an idea born in the context of European integration; reflections on the idea 
of Europe are of course much older, but were hardly ever phrased as reflections on ‘European identity’. 
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gesturing vaguely towards the solution of a problem, to that elusive substance which can oil 
the system’s parts. ‘European identity’ presents itself as a word which, if spoken enough 
times, can place distance between the EU and its critics, warding off charges that the EU faces 
a crisis of legitimacy (Shore 2000; Strath 2002). Likewise for the EU’s critics, European 
identity and its alleged weakness is a nicely-shaped stick with which to bop Brussels on the 
head. The concept’s ambiguity can be a plus, as it inhibits closer inspection. Alternatively, 
when ‘European identity’ is used by scholars, it is often as a means to cluster a range of 
narrower issues and debates, projecting them as part of a larger research programme. Those 
studying such diverse matters as trends in European media reporting, EU public policy, 
institutional discourse, practices of EU citizenship, public attitudes to the EU institutions, 
support for European integration in principle, attitudes to fellow citizens, or commitment to a 
range of value orientations, have a tendency to frame their research as the study of ‘European 
identity’, presumably so as to broaden their readership, and no doubt encouraged by their 
publishers, for whom the term is a reliable selling point. In other words, in deployments of the 
phrase ‘European identity’, the structure of the thing described is often secondary to the 
political or scholarly agenda behind it. Form follows function, one could say. 
To assess European identity as real or illusory requires us to suspend these doubts 
about its analytical worth and sketch out a sharper meaning. What might this be? 
 
Conceiving Identity 
In general terms, those invoking ‘European identity’ apparently wish to make reference to the 
oneness and stability of a social grouping. Identity in this context implies a set of people 
united by common dispositions, and who exhibit continuity in what they share. Two 
variations on this idea can be distinguished, one more objectivist and one more subjectivist. 
Rather than as fully distinct, they are best approached as differing alloys of the same ideas, for 
most thinkers of identity combine elements found in both. 
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In the first view, identity is objectively real but subjectively renegotiated. That is to 
say, the common dispositions which individuals share are taken to be grounded in realities 
beyond their individual or collective choosing, and can never fully be cast off, even if they 
can be accentuated, de-accentuated and contested. So, for example, it might be said that 
‘Europeans’ are those who share a distinctive set of Judaeo-Christian ideas which shape how 
they see the world, and that this holds true even if they are unaware of this fact, or if they 
choose to ascribe it different meanings. Despite the nod to subjective understanding, the 
privileged perspective is that of the observer – it is (s)he who determines the existence or 
absence of identity, and it is against his or her standard that the relevant individuals are 
assessed. In this view, people can be mistaken about their identity: they might, for instance, be 
‘European’ without knowing it, or believe they were European when they could not be. That 
people may be misled in this way is well captured in the concept of ‘false consciousness’, 
which would be the standard Marxist interpretation of national identity. The challenge for all 
objectivist perspectives lies in how to ground the observer’s knowledge. If mistakes are 
possible, why trust in the observer’s omniscience? Why see their account as immune to the 
peculiarities of personal interpretation? And which observer – whose word should be taken as 
final? While an objectivist conception of European identity is sometimes advanced (e.g. 
Siedentop 2000), it is difficult to endorse with confidence. In any case, its rather rigid 
understanding of identity is likely to make it a blunt tool for responding to the underlying 
political question of governability. 
In the second, more interpretivist perspective, identities stand or fall by people’s 
willingness to express them. They cannot exist in latent form, since the sympathies which 
comprise them have no underlying basis beyond people’s willingness to adopt and display 
them. Here, identity refers to reciprocal feelings of attachment, or practices of identification 
as one might call them so as to emphasise the open-endedness of the process (Brubaker and 
Cooper 2000, p.14). Diffuse feelings of sympathy towards others are the focal-point, whether 
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tied in with cultural attributes or, as in civic approaches such as ‘constitutional patriotism’, the 
political values ascribed to the collectivity. While the spotlight is on people’s interpretations, 
still one generally finds a nod to objectivism in the notion that these practices of identification 
are supported, stabilised and given visibility by various extra-cognitive phenomena: for 
instance the repeated deployment of key concepts and social categories (e.g. ‘Europe’, 
‘Europeans’), of narratives which build on these, and by the cultivation of symbols (e.g. flags 
and constitutions). Importantly – a point which the language of identification brings out more 
clearly than identity – these latter elements (words, narratives, symbols, etc.) are resources for 
identification but not constitutive of it: the research object cannot be reduced to these visible 
manifestations. The emphasis is on meanings – on how these resources are used and 
interpreted.  
This conception of identity, more than the first, invites empirical investigation to 
establish its content. For some, this necessitates the use of opinion polls – European identity is 
then studied as the willingness of individuals to respond favourably to questions concerning 
how European they feel. For others, it points to the use of qualitative research methods such 
as interviews, the anthropological study of everyday-life situations, or the analysis of legal 
and political texts. (Differences of method may reflect not just differences of methodology but 
differences concerning whether identity is viewed as something consciously felt and 
susceptible to articulation, or something that exists at a tacit level and which can only emerge 
spontaneously.) Given that, in contrast to objectivist accounts, these practices of identification 
are not treated as a function of long-term historical truths, they are potentially quite 
unpredictable. Accordingly, some would argue the term ‘identity’ should be replaced with one 
that does not presume continuity of practice and meaning across time (‘self-understanding’ 
has been a suggested alternative); but where continuity is suspected, ‘identity’ would seem a 
valid description.  
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In this latter sense, then, and postponing certain further ambiguities, a common 
European identity would exist when people express mutual sympathies to one another as 
‘Europeans’, and under-gird this with appeal to signs and discourses that refer to ‘Europe’. 
(Whether such sympathies would be compatible with enduring special sympathies to fellow 
nationals is a matter of much debate – cf. Duchesne 2011a.) This conception’s advantage is 
that, to a degree, it avoids reifying ‘identity’ as something stable and irrevocable. One avoids 
the problem of ‘latent’ identities, and allows individuals greater scope to shape and revise the 
identities they ascribe to (since identity is then something which depends on their assent, 
rather than a fate to which they are consigned). This conception is not without its own 
problems – chiefly, the epistemological one of how to establish when these practices of 
identification are present, given they may be viewed as little more than traces in the individual 
brain; but also the conceptual one that the further one moves in the direction of open-ended 
practice the less appropriate a static term such as identity becomes. There will also be plenty 
of boundary problems, given the emphasis on reciprocal recognition: what does one make of 
those individuals who claim allegiance to a grouping yet whose membership is questioned by 
others? Involuntary membership is the same problem in reverse. Still, it is broadly this 
conception of a common European identity which presents itself as the kind worth examining 
for its real or illusory character. 
A question remains: how many people would need to engage in these reciprocal 
practices of identification before they would amount to something one could feasibly call 
‘European identity’? What would their necessary scope be? Given the identity question tends 
to be posed in the light of concerns about a polity’s governability, the assumption is generally 
that a common European identity would need to encompass all EU citizens, or at least a 
sizeable majority of them. In other words, it is expected to extend widely across the 
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inhabitants of a politically-defined territory.
2
 (Note here the ambiguity of the word ‘common’, 
which denotes both something shared and something banal, something of the ‘common 
people’.) Yet in principle it need not be an inclusive, mass phenomenon: one might equally 
conceive it as the reserve of an elite, a form of distinction perhaps, functioning like French 
aristocratic culture in the early modern period as a basis for reciprocal recognition amongst 
Europe’s elites. Access to European identity would be exclusive to those of the most exquisite 
refinement and good taste. That the matter is seldom cast in this way is testament to the 
origins of the identity debate in political concerns at least partly shaped by modern ideas of 
universal citizenship and political equality. 
 
European identity: a foolish myth? 
The most defensible conception of a common European identity has something to do then 
with stable and reciprocal practices of identification between all or most inhabitants of a given 
territorial space. Alternative conceptions are either dogmatic, incoherent, or best captured 
with a different vocabulary. As we switch to the empirical question of whether such practices 
of identification currently exist on a European scale, we are confronted with largely negative 
findings. Despite clear efforts by the EU institutions to cultivate them, they remain rather thin 
on the ground. 
The absence, or at least marginality, of something one might call European identity 
seems apparent however one investigates it empirically. For those who seek its traces in 
Eurobarometer opinion polls, popular willingness to declare attachment to ‘Europe’ and 
‘Europeans’ generally emerges as weak (Kohli 2000, Duchesne 2008). There are notable 
differences across countries and social groups (Fligstein 2008), but this merely reaffirms the 
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 It is ironic that the contours of collective identity are often expected to follow political boundaries (here those 
of the EU), despite the fact identity is invoked precisely to compensate for the alleged inability of institutions to 
generate allegiances independent of prior attachments.  
7 
 
absence of mass regularity of the kind ‘identity’ would suggest. While there are certainly 
those willing to declare that they ‘feel European’, how far this translates into meaningful 
practices of identification away from the polling context is unclear. For those using interview 
techniques, the finding tends to be that ‘Europe’ rarely provokes an emotional response, 
instead being a point of indifference or resignation (Duchesne et al., 2010b, White 2011). 
Only those with extensive factual knowledge feel themselves qualified to discuss Europe in 
depth: it is a topic one learns (in schools, or in the financial press) rather than an object of 
spontaneous affection (Gaxie et al. 2010; cf. chapters by Throssell and Bozec in Duchesne 
2010a). For scholars taking an ethnographic approach, for instance studying the self-
understanding of mobile elites as they move across Europe in search of jobs, romance or 
adventure, the finding tends to be not that they have subsumed themselves within a European 
collective, but rather that they have taken modest steps towards ‘de-nationalisation’, i.e. 
towards freeing themselves of existing territorial ties (Favell 2007). Researchers of border 
communities meanwhile report that the removal of physical barriers to movement has often 
been accompanied either by forms of symbolic ‘rebordering’ (i.e. new forms of separation, 
e.g. between the Poles and Germans of Słubice / Frankfurt-an-der-Oder), or the development 
of discourses of local exceptionalism (e.g. consciousness as a ‘border region’ that transcends 
the usual categories of allegiance) (Asher 2005, Meinhof 2004). Clearly, the uncertainty 
regarding which research methods are best suited to studying collective identity leaves scope 
for those dissatisfied with a negative finding to argue that it is the method rather than the 
object which is faulty; still, there does seem to be a broad convergence of results across these 
varied approaches. In short, while changes in the self-understanding of Europeans seem to be 
happening, they are not generally happening under the European sign, and do not entail 
patterns of reciprocal identification co-extensive with a pan-European space. 
Of course, it may be premature to conclude where such changes are leading. Perhaps 
these practices of identification will emerge. In the meantime, one option is to revise our 
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conception of European identity in a more realist direction. Diffuse feelings of sympathy 
towards others as Europeans are, it might be argued, admittedly hard to discern, and in the 
most literal sense European identity is illusory. Yet perhaps the idea is meaningful 
nonetheless. Even if individuals themselves show few signs of such an identity, and can 
discern no such thing when plumbing the depths of their consciousness, if they can be 
persuaded others feel such a thing, at least at critical moments, then it might exist in virtual 
form. As a feeling people project onto others rather than themselves, a concept they assume 
must have meaning even if it means little to them, ‘European identity’s’ effect might be to 
encourage people to act as though they shared in such a thing, even when they did not. 
Identity might then be seen as a fiction in the strict sense, but a useful fiction.
3
 Such a position 
represents a third, inter-subjective conception of European identity. Although it is little 
discussed in debates on European identity, such a conception has equivalents in the theory of 
public opinion (e.g. Noelle-Neuman 1984). It implies an interesting and feasible research 
question: how far people think others subscribe to a European identity (or how far they are 
willing to be persuaded by such a claim). Possibly the results would mirror those found by 
conventional approaches, but possibly not: certainly these second-order beliefs may be more 
susceptible to manipulation than the brute feelings of individuals. European identity would 
probably not be the first collective identity to exist primarily as a dubious but widely-held 
conviction.
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 Alternatively the reality / illusion dichotomy might be abandoned, on the grounds that it is a permanently open 
question what people can be persuaded to think on this matter, much depending on mobilisation in specific 
instances. 
4
 The famous ‘permissive consensus’ may be seen as founded exactly on the widespread belief that ‘most 
people’ favoured European integration and therefore ‘I’ will go along with it, with resistance building precisely 
when the beliefs of others were put in question by certain landmark referenda results. 
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Whether this back-door variant has purchase or not, sooner or later a normative issue 
arises: is a common European identity such a benevolent notion that it is worth rehabilitating 
even in this rather mythical fashion? Arguably at least some versions of the idea constitute not 
only an illusion but a dangerous illusion. First, if, as we have argued, any meaningful 
application of the term ‘identity’ requires the supposition of a stable pattern of reciprocal 
practices of identification encompassing all or nearly all members of a given realm, it points 
to a rather consensual image of social relations. One sees this in particular in those 
conceptions of European identity which focus on shared cultural traditions inherited from the 
past. Such images have little to say about the diversities and adversarialisms one associates 
with a pluralist political community: antagonisms are likely to be denied within the 
community and turned outward on the world beyond it. Identity-talk is generally a means to 
convince people that they are alike and that their relations are harmonious, often with the 
purpose of making them easier to govern. As a model of citizenship it has clear tendencies to 
conformism, complacency and acquiescence. Of course, defenders of the concept will say this 
is a misconception: that they have in mind something far more polysemic, with individuals 
free to disagree on what European identity means and how they will enact it. Yet the further 
one emphasises fluidity and disagreement, the less reason one has to speak of identity at all. 
As Brubaker and Cooper put it (2000, p.11), ‘it is not clear why weak conceptions of 
“identity” are conceptions of identity. The everyday sense of “identity” strongly suggests at 
least some self-sameness over time, some persistence, something that remains identical, the 
same, while other things are changing. What is the point in using the term “identity” if this 
core meaning is expressly repudiated?’ 
Second, by setting the bar so high on the kind of social integration needed for a viable 
polity, the concept can also acquire conservative connotations, acting as a resource for those 
who wish to argue a population is ungovernable and that certain political initiatives must 
therefore never be attempted. Here again, there is a performative dimension to appeals to 
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European identity. The notion that Europeans lack a common identity can be used to de-
legitimise transfers of wealth from affluent parts of the EU to poor, or the strengthening of the 
European Parliament vis-à-vis other EU institutions. Fair enough, one might say, if reciprocal 
practices of identification are indeed the precondition for such initiatives. Yet such a 
sweeping claim can be no more than a hypothesis, and an extremely difficult one to test at 
that. One should be sceptical of those bearing decisive evidence in its favour. When it is 
observed that ‘Europeans’ are reluctant to see the supranationalisation of taxation powers 
because they ‘lack a sense of European identity’, the listener might ask themselves whether it 
is not rather that there are powerful individuals who wish to prevent such an outcome, and 
who, rather than debate the merits of such an initiative, wish to give people a reason why it is 
impossible. 
 
Beyond European Identity 
To criticise notions of European identity is not to underestimate the importance of the 
political question we began with. There are those who would rubbish the idea of European 
identity on the grounds that the EU institutions need nothing but the coercive force of the law 
to govern, and nothing but a trail of constitutional transfers of power to guarantee their 
legitimacy. But these are bad grounds on which to reject the notion. Social integration of one 
kind or another seems both empirically and normatively necessary if the EU is to persist in an 
acceptable form – just not the kind ‘European identity’ implies. 
There are various ways of conceiving transnational political community without 
appeal to European identity. One is to emphasise the variety of perspectives people take on 
Europe as opposed to the singular view conjured by the term ‘identity’. This type of ‘narrative 
diversity’ has been proposed as an already existing reality for Europe’s intellectual elites 
(Lacroix and Nicolaidis, 2010), even if questions remain regarding how far it permeates 
European societies as a whole. Another possibility is to avoid altogether the search for a 
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diffuse set of sympathies towards ‘Europeans’ in general, looking instead to non-territorial 
forms of subjecthood which draw together some but not all. Political categories such as Left 
and Right, and ideological labels such as conservatism, liberalism and socialism, are of 
potential relevance here (White, forthcoming). So too are social categories which evoke 
equivalence of experience according to occupation or socio-economic status (e.g. ‘public 
sector workers’, ‘farmers’, ‘journalists’), and the practices of cross-national comparison 
which may generate receptiveness to them (White 2011). Issue-specific concerns and relations 
of adversarialism seem as plausible a basis for cross-national allegiances as the widely 
inclusive ties of European identity, and are arguably more consistent with political pluralism. 
Rather than an entity reified and made the target of identification, ‘Europe’ and its political 
arenas are best seen as a terrain on which events, actions and diverse experiences unfold – the 
stage rather than the heroic actor. 
“European identity” as a phrase is likely to be with us for some time, as various actors 
have reason to use it. Even empty phrases can be real in their consequences if enough people 
take them seriously, but it is not clear that we are at that point, or even heading in that 
direction. As something more substantial, the notion is yet more remote. European identity is 
an illusion, and some would say a foolish one. But it has been invented to respond to a 
genuine problem, one that will persist as long as efforts to govern Europe as one.  
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